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ABSTRACT 
We construct a model to identify determinants of the diffusion rate of standards in a food 
chain. We argue that adoption decisions in the food chain are determined by farmers’ and 
processors’ economic considerations. Factors such as pricing behavior, compliance costs and 
market structure, all of which influence the adoption of standards, are identified and discussed 
in the paper. The findings are used to test an econometric model utilizing data on Polish milk 
processing firms in the period between 2000 and 2002. The results indicate that input and 
output prices have a significant influence on the diffusion rate of standards. The dominance of 
large-scale holdings in the relevant procurement market significantly increases, whereas high 
compliance costs decrease the diffusion. Small cooperatives were found to face significant 
problems in procuring high quality raw materials compared to their competitors. 
Keywords: product quality, standards, EU enlargement, industrial organization. 
1  BACKGROUND 
The “quality turn” (ALLAIRE, 2004) has, in recent years, become an ubiquitous phenomenon 
and has stimulated a significant body of research. However, the current literature on quality 
issues tends to focus on the competing concepts of ‘standards as barriers’ and ‘standards as 
catalysts’  in  the  context  of  food  safety  regulations  and  requirements  for  industrialized 
countries engaging in international agricultural trade (HENSON, JAFFEE, 2006; JOSLING et al., 
2004).  Thus  far  little  work  has  been  published  on  quality  issues  in  transition  countries, 
especially those which have recently joined the European Union (EU). This is astonishing, 
since EU membership obliges the adoption of the total body of community law accumulated 
thus far (acquis communautaire). For agri-food businesses based in the current EU-aspirants, 
this  means  that  all  mandatory  EU  standards  concerning  food  production,  processing  and 
retailing have to be met by the day of accession, or after a fixed transitional period. The recent 
history of the EU’s eastward enlargement reveals that especially in countries with a majority 
of small-scale holdings and processors, the compliance process is relatively slow (BERKUM, 
2005; PIENIADZ et al., 2004). Particularly, the adoption of EU hygiene regulations for food of 
animal  origin  is  one  of  the  biggest  challenges,  because  the  regulations  contain  various 
obligations  for  technical  equipment  and  building  installations.  Moreover,  the  diffusion  of 
voluntary, private quality standards from Western countries has put additional pressure on 
agri-business operators in accession countries (HANF, PIENIADZ, 2006). The firms’ changing 
environment, including the reform of official control authorities and ongoing restructuring 
processes at all stages in the food chain, have caused some delays in the compliance process. 
Analyses of quality standards adoption in light of EU accession focus mainly on the economic 
impact  of  foreign-imposed  standards  on  the  structure  of  agricultural  markets  (RAU,  VAN 
TONGEREN, 2006; HOCKMANN, PIENIADZ, 2005). Still, which factors are driving compliance 
with quality requirements on the micro level remains highly ambiguous, regardless of whether 
governmental or private standards are considered. Some studies cite compliance costs as the 
main determinant of standards’ adoption. The majority of these studies, however, are either 
based on the desire to provide policy-makers with basic information about the costs of various 
new  food  safety  regulations  in  order  to  identify  cost-effective  food  safety  approaches 
(UNNEVEHR,  JENSEN,  2001;  ANTLE,  2000),  or  to  provide  information  about  the  costs  of 
implementing  and  enforcing  the  acquis  communautaire  in  order  to  assess  the  need  for 
governmental aid to support the compliance process (KISS, WEINGARTEN, 2003). Thus, while 
recognizing that the cost side dominates research on the adoption of standards, there is a need 
for ‘rebalancing’ the current debate in this area by considering in addition factors influencing 
the returns of the quality standards adoption.   3 
Our  paper  aims  to  fill  this  gap  in  the  literature  by  identifying  factors  that  are  driving 
compliance with quality standards at the micro level. We argue that the adoption of standards 
is guided by the producers’ and processors’ expected profits before and after improvements in 
food safety and quality. This implies that the adoption of standards is affected not only by 
costs but also by additional revenues associated with compliance. Our main hypothesis is that 
through  quality-related  payment  schemes,  downstream  firms  can  significantly  affect  the 
diffusion of quality standards in upstream sectors. In the next section we develop a theoretical 
model  to  identify  the  driving  factors  of  the  diffusion  process.  The  empirical  application 
concerns the Polish dairy sector prior to transition (2000 – 2002). This market is particularly 
interesting, since (1) milk is an important product of both EU and Polish agriculture, (2) a 
wide range of hygiene standards must be implemented during the accession process, and (3) 
milk production in Poland is dominated by small farms, which causes sluggish diffusion of 
EU quality standards (PIENIADZ et al., 2004). 
2  THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
2.1  Basic assumption 
Farmers deliver raw material of various qualities to processors. But manufacturing a high 
quality consumer good requires a minimum quality of a raw material (qmin). If the quality is 
below qmin, the stability of the final products cannot be guaranteed, because both undesirable 
attributes  of  the  raw  material  (sensory,  microbiological  attributes)  and  problems  in  the 
processing stage can cause inferior quality in the final products. The prices of high and low 
quality products are wh and wl, respectively, with wh ³ wl. Both prices are exogenous, which 
implies processors on the retail level exhibit price-taking behavior. 
Prices received by the farmers are correlated with product quality. High quality raw materials 
are  remunerated  by  vh,  while  the  price  for  low  quality  raw  material  is  vl,  with  vh  ³  vl. 
Corresponding to the choice of production techniques, the farmer can be of two different 
types: low (tl) or high (th) quality producers. The distribution of raw product quality differs 
with respect to the applied technique. We assume that technique th stochastically dominates tl 
to the first order, i.e., Fh(q) < Fl(q), "q. In addition, we assume that the choice of qmin does 
not  allow  the  exact  identification  of  the  production  technique,  i.e.,  Fh(qmin) > 0  and 
Fl(qmin) < 1. 
Technique th requires additional resources or compliance costs (k) such as special animal 
feed, additional sanitary measures, and investment in building and equipment. We do not 
distinguish between fixed and variable costs and assume, for simplicity, that these costs are 
constant for a farmer. Thus, the additional average cost of technique th decreases with an 
increase  in  the  amount  of  raw  material  production  (x).  Moreover,  compliance  costs  are 
assumed to be the same for all farmers. Thus, farmers differ only with respect to the scale of 
production. Farm size is distributed according to function f(x). 
Because of higher value added, the processor has an incentive to specialize in high-quality 
production, which requires farmers to deliver the corresponding quality of raw material. This 
in turn requires sufficient remuneration of the resources allocated to agricultural production. 
The market for low quality raw milk is assumed to be competitive, since the farmer may 
choose among various marketing channels. This suggests that the low quality procurement 
price (vl) is also given. However, on the market for high quality products, entry restrictions 
such as high investment requirements can cause the processor to act as a monopsonist. Thus, 
vh is the processors’ only decision variable. Moreover, vh influences farm revenues, and thus 
affects farmers’ adoption decisions. After the processor has announced vh, farmers decide to   4 
adopt or not to adopt production technique th. We assume that there is a marginal farmer 
(x*), who is indifferent to adoption or non-adoption. Since adoption costs decrease with farm 
size, those with higher production than x* will, by definition, be located in the group of high 
quality raw material producers, while smaller farms will remain with tl. 
The optimal vh can be found as follows: First, the processor announces a vh. Second, farmers 
decide to adopt or not to adopt. The diffusion of the high quality techniques occurs according 
to the farm characteristics and the price of the high quality raw material. The optimal vh is 
found by backward induction. The processor takes the farmers’ decision into account and 
fixes vh so that profits will be maximized.  
2.2  The marginal farmer 
A risk-neutral farmer compares expected profits with (Eph) and without (Epl) adoption of the 
high quality production technique: 
  ( ) k - ]    v    v - 1 [ x  E l h h h F + F = h p  and  
  ( ) ]    v     v - 1 [ x  E l l h l F + F = l p . 
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2.3  The processor’s decision 
The processor’s expected profits are: 
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The first term is negative and represents profit loss due to an increase in the price of high 
quality raw materials. The second term is a profits increase because of a reduction in the 
adoption threshold. Conducting the differentiation and collecting terms provides: 
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Given  that  the  second  order  condition  holds,  the  comparative  statics  are  given  by  the 
differentiation of (3) with respect to the corresponding factor. The individual effects are: 
  0 >
a d
dvh , for a = k, vl, wl, Fl, X and  0 <
a d
dvh , for a = wh, Fh. 
In the following, we concentrate on the diffusion of the high quality production technique: 
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Conducting the indicated differentiation provides: 














, for a = wh, Fh. 
3  EMPIRICAL IMPLEMENTATION 
Our  empirical  application  deals  with  the  Polish  dairy  sector  from  2000  to  2002.  The 
theoretical hypotheses  were derived by assuming processors’ price-taking behavior for all 
final products on the consumer market and for low quality raw materials on the procurement 
market. A monopsony was assumed to characterize the market structure for high quality raw 
materials. Since the theoretical results would differ with regard to the firms’ behavior, we first 
show that the market structure assumptions are consistent with the situation in the Polish dairy 
sector. 
Given  the  tradability  of  manufactured  dairy  products  and  the  relatively  large  number  of 
processors in Poland, dairy  product prices can  be expected to be fixed for the individual 
processor. On the contrary, processors might be able to exploit considerable oligopsonistic 
market power on the procurement stage. Perhaps the most important reason for this is the 
limited tradability of raw milk due to its high risk of deterioration and its high transportation 
costs.  However,  since  a  ‘dual  standard  system’  for  food  quality  was  possible  during  the 
investigated period, the farmers could sell low quality raw milk directly to consumers or to 
small manufacturers who do not possess the technology to produce high quality products. 
Both opportunities limit the processors’ pricing strategies regarding low quality raw milk. 
3.1  Data base 
Data on individual dairy processors in Poland were collected from several sources. Our main 
database was provided by BOSS, Economic Information, Ltd., in Poland, which conducted 
regular dairy processing company surveys. The available set contains annual data from 2000 
to 2002. Since the identity of the individual firms was known, additional information from 
regional statistics could be included: these are the location of each firm and its ownership 
status.  By  utilizing  information  about  the  location  of  a  firm,  a  set  of  regional  variables 
corresponding to the relevant market of the ith firm/chain have been compiled.   6 
Table 1:  Relevance of the investigated sample 
  Employees  Revenue  NPM 
  Sample 
in 1,000 






Share in the  
dairy 
industry 
Sample  Dairy 
industry 
2000  12.4  25%  792.7  32%  0.79  0.10 
2001  17.5  36%  1496.9  50%  1.98  0.04 
2002  14.7  32%  1318.4  47%  2.17  0.45 
Sources:  BOSS (2004), IERiGZ (var. issues), GUS (var. issues b). 
Note:  NPM: Net Profit Margins: A ratio of profitability calculated as net earnings divided by revenues. 
Since participation in the survey differs between years, only data from dairies with the same 
number of observations for all variables were used in the analysis. These concern 38 dairies in 
2000, 60 in 2001 and 50 in 2002. The three abovementioned sub-samples have been pooled, 
providing 148 observations. The original goal of the survey was to create a ranking of the 
Polish dairies. Due to the voluntary participation in the ranking, it is likely that primarily 
firms with good business performance and prospective are represented in the data set. The 
higher profit margin of the investigated sample compared to the industry average confirms our 
presumption (see Table 1). 
Most of the firms are large and medium-sized companies, although firm size ranges from 40 
employees up to 1,300 in the pooled survey data. The data set is dominated by cooperatives, 
which  accounted  for  93%  (138)  of  the  investigated  dairies.  A  typical  firm  in  the  sample 
processes a wide spectrum of products (drinking milk, yogurt, cheese, etc.). Thus, the sample 
is a good representation of the Polish dairy sector.  
3.2  Parameterization 
The  theoretical  model  suggests  strong  interactions  among  expected  profits  of  the  dairy 
company (pi), diffusion of standards (Qi) and the prices for raw materials (vi). Because of 
these mutual relationships, the appropriate approach is to estimate a simultaneous equation 
model treating the abovementioned variables as jointly endogenous. One central variable in 
the diffusion model is the differential in retail prices for high and low quality products (wh – 
wl). Unfortunately, the data set provides only information about average regional prices (wi). 
We assume that higher values of wi are connected to a higher share of quality goods in the 
consumption bundles of a given regional market, and that they are influenced by consumer 
income (Ii) and the presence of foreign investors (DPi) in the ith region. In order to account 
for  these  determinants,  we  incorporate  a  retail  price  equation  in  the  model.  Thus,  the 
estimated system consists of four equations: 
Processors’ profit:   pi = a1
 + a2Qi +a3vi +a4wi + a5DFi + a6si + ep, i 
Diffusion rate of standards:  Qi = b1
 +b2vi +b3wi + b4xi + b5ki + b6DFi + eq, i 
Procurement prices:  vi = j1 + j2wi + j3xi + j4ki + j5si + ev, i 
Retail prices:  wi = g1 + g2Ii + g3DPi + ew, i 
Here, DFi, si, xi, ki, represent dairy firm characteristics, regional market share on the raw milk 
market, average farm size, and compliance costs in the ith region, respectively. The definition 
and descriptive statistics of all variables used are reported in Table 2.   7 
Table 2:  Definition and descriptive statistics of used variables 




Q  Share of EU-conforming raw milk (“extra” class) in the 





p  Firm-specific earnings before interest and taxes in PLN 





v  Average procurement price for raw milk in a region, 





w  Average retail prices for drinking milk in a region, 





x  Farm size, defined as share of farms that own more than 





k  Proxy for compliance costs in a region, defined as share of 
“live power" of draft horses in the total draft force 





s  Relative dairy size, defined as a dairy’s share of the 





COSM  Dummy variable for a small cooperatives: the variable is 
set equal to one if the firm procures less than 35 m liters 





COLG  Dummy variable for a large cooperatives: the variable 
takes the value of one if the firm procures more than 75 m 









DP  Dummy variable for the existence of FDI; the variable is 
set equal to one if there is at least one foreign dairy in the 





I  Annual gross disposable income per capita in a region, 





Source:  BOSS (2004), GUS (2001), GUS (2005), GUS (var. issues a), Internet research, telephone survey. 
Note:  Number of observations: 148. 
Profits p are approximated by earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) per kg of processed 
milk. EBIT is an adequate indicator of a company's financial performance, since it allows a 
comparison amongst heterogeneous firms while omitting the effects of firm-specific financing 
and accounting decisions. Normalization was conducted in order to control for scale effects in 
the processing. Profits are expected to increase with the diffusion of higher standards, lower 
procurement costs and higher prices for final milk products (a2  > 0, a3 < 0, and a4 > 0). The 
variable  DF  was  approximated  by  a  firm-specific  dummy  variable  indicating  different 
ownership  structures.  There  is  evidence  suggesting  that  private  firms  perform  better  than 
cooperatives. Additionally, large cooperatives are more likely to face financial disadvantages 
due to their complex governance structures compared to their smaller competitors (FULTON,   8 
GIANNAKAS, 2001). Corresponding to this consideration, ownership structure was coded in 
three  binary  dummy  variables:  PRIV  for  private  dairy  processors,  COSM  for  small,  and 
COLG for large cooperatives. The expected sequence of the estimates is aPRIV > aCOSM > 
aCOLG.  Furthermore,  we  expect  oligopsonistic  market  power,  captured  by  the  companies’ 
regional market share (s), to have a positive impact on the processors’ profits (a6 >0). 
Diffusion (Q) is captured by the degree of compliance with EU standards within the dairy 
companies. The dependent variable is defined as the share of EU-conforming raw milk in the 
total milk procurement of the ith milk-processing firm. According to our theoretical model, 
higher procurement and product prices, as well as higher farm sizes, have a positive impact on 
the diffusion of quality standards (b2  > 0, b3 > 0, and b4 > 0). Due to the lack of a more 
appropriate measure, we proxy the compliance costs, k, with an index based on draft force 
resources in agriculture. A high share of live horsepower in the total draft force resources can 
be  regarded  as  an  indicator  of  a  generally  outdated  production  technique.  An  obstacle 
technique requires additional investment and increases compliance costs, and thus decreases 
the incentives to implement production techniques that promote the production of high quality 
raw milk. Thus, we expect b5 < 0. There are no a priori assumptions about the influence of 
the ownership structure on the diffusion rate of standards. However, it is likely that due to 
their membership commitment, agents delivering to a cooperative have additional motivation 
to adopt a given standard. On the other hand, private dairies have more freedom to select high 
quality  producers,  which  would  suggest  a  higher  diffusion  rate  as  far  as  private  firms  as 
integrators are considered. 
According to theoretical considerations, high quality raw material prices (vi) are a function of 
farm size (x), retail prices (w) and compliance costs (k). The comparative statics yield j2 > 0, 
j3 > 0 and j4  < 0. In order to account for oligopsonsitic market power, we included regional 
market  share  (s),  in  the  equation  explaining  procurement  prices.  Since  this  variable 
corresponds with the processors’ bargaining power, and hence its ability to drive prices down, 
we expect j5 to be negative. 
As mentioned above, we approximate retail prices by regional disposable income, I, as an 
indicator of demand for high quality products and by the existence of foreign direct investors, 
DP, as an indicator of the supply side. Because of the positive correlation between quality 
demand  and  income,  g2 > 0  is  expected.  In  general,  foreign  investors  concentrate  on  the 
production of high quality products. Thus, the average prices for the final product should 
differ among regions with and without FDI in the dairy sector. This information has been 
coded in the corresponding dummy variable, DP. We expect a positive effect of DP on the 
average retail price (g3 > 0). 
3.3  Estimation and inference 
The model was estimated using pooled survey data from the three sub-samples in the years 
2000 - 2002. The mutual interdependence of the four equations suggests a 3SLS approach. In 
all  equations  the  number  of  excluded  exogenous  variables  is  larger  than  the  number  of 
endogenous variables used as regressors; thus, the system is over-identified. The parameters 
can  be  estimated  without  additional  restrictions  or  non-sample  information  (JUDGE  et  al., 
1985, p. 577).   9 
Table 3:  3SLS estimates of diffusion model for the Polish dairy sector 
    OLS  ILS  3SLS 









price  Explanatory 
variable 
Symbol 
Q  Q  p  Q  v  w 
Diffusion  Q  -  -  0.17*** 
(0.01) 
-  -  - 
Procurement 
price 
v  0.35 
(0.243) 




-  - 
Retail price  w  0.29 
(0.47) 
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I  -  - 0.14 
(0.08) 




DP  -  0.10*** 
(0.03) 












2    0.30  0.37  -       




-       
Note:  ***, **, * indicate that the variable is significant at the 1, 5 or 10 percent level, respectively. Standard errors are 
given in parentheses. Degrees of freedom for the F-tests are in brackets. We do not report the R
2 values for the 
profit equation, since the estimation provided negative values. 
Source:  own estimates 
Estimation results are reported in Table 3. For comparison, we also report estimates of the 
diffusion  equation  as  provided  by  OLS,  and  a  reduced  form  estimation  of  the  diffusion 
equation as provided by indirect least squares (ILS). OLS produces inconsistent estimates 
because the endogeneity of raw material prices is not accounted for. ILS ignores the influence 
of procurement prices on diffusion. Moreover, exogenous variables, which have an indirect 
affect on the structural form, influence the rate of diffusion directly. Thus, the ILS procedure 
does not allow identification of the structural relationships among the variables. Because of 
these inadequacies, in the following we focus on interpreting the 3SLS results.   10 
In  principle,  our  hypothesis  regarding  the  impact  of  the  individual  variables  on  the 
endogenous variables cannot be rejected. The majority of the estimated coefficients yield the 
expected sign and are highly significant. Nevertheless, estimates providing unexpected results 
(compliance  costs)  and  determinants,  which  were  supposed  to  have  an  ambiguous  effect, 
especially on the diffusion rate (ownership structure), require additional comments. 
First, the results do not confirm our assumption about the negative impact of compliance costs 
on the diffusion of standards. One explanation is that due to its construction, k represents the 
production costs rather than the assumed compliance costs. The estimates of the procurement 
price equation seem to favor this interpretation, since they show a significant positive impact 
of the ‘cost variable’ on procurement prices. 
Second,  cooperatives  seem  to  face  different  problems  as  far  as  different  firm  sizes  are 
concerned. The  coefficients suggest that small  cooperatives have  a negative effect on the 
diffusion rate of standards at the procurement stage. Among large cooperatives, as well as 
private dairies, no significant influence of ownership on the diffusion rate could be found. 
This suggests that milk chains with a small cooperative as an integrator face more problems 
when procuring high quality raw milk. One explanation is that small cooperatives included in 
the  investigated  sample  are  mainly  located  in  highly-competitive  regions  where  a  high 
number of dairies must share the relevant procurement market. Small cooperatives are likely 
to  have  lower  purchasing  power,  and  hence  to  lose  high  quality  producers.  However, 
purchasing relatively poor-quality inputs does not seem to affect the performance of the small 
cooperatives, as suggested by the estimated coefficient in the profit-equation. Thus, while 
large cooperatives appear to suffer from considerable inefficiencies, small cooperatives are 
more likely to focus on a core set of activities and did relatively well in the investigated 
period. 
The R
2 is an inappropriate measure of fit in the context of simultaneous systems because the 
instrumental  variable  relationships  among  the  endogenous  variables  are  not  appropriately 
considered (LIMDEP, 2007). Thus, we neither report the R
2 values nor the F – statistics for the 
3SLS equations. However, the relatively low values of R
2 obtained by ILS and OLS suggest 
that our analysis may possess low explanatory power. Indeed, the low explanatory power has 
to be expected since we applied average regional prices and a regional proxy for compliance 
costs. In addition, due to the lack of appropriate data we could not account for all individual 
negotiations among the milk producers and the milk-processing firm (i.e., producer-specific 
payments due to membership in cooperatives or amount of milk delivery). 
4  CONCLUSIONS 
Our main interest was to analyze the diffusion of EU quality standards in the Polish dairy 
chains. To account for the interdependencies along the dairy chain, we estimated a multiple 
equations  model  (3SLS)  treating  diffusion  rate,  processors’  profit,  procurement  and  retail 
price as endogenous variables. The results confirm the theoretical findings and suggest, first 
of  all,  that  the  adoption  of  standards  is  an  economic  activity  guided  by  producers’  and 
processors’  cost  and  benefits  calculations.  Hence,  the  farmer  will  improve  a  production 
technique in order to comply with standards only if the purchasers distinguish among the high 
and low quality producers and are able to remunerate their additional efforts towards higher 
quality.  For  the  processing  firm,  a  separating  solution  also  seems  to  be  a  superior  one, 
especially if an increasing demand for high quality consumer products exists. 
The empirical analysis provides that an increase in the price for high quality material fosters 
adoption.  Our  results  also  suggest  that  larger  holdings  are  more  likely  to  adopt  quality 
standards than small farms. Since Poland faces considerable structural problems in animal   11 
production,  one  opportunity  to  push  forward  the  diffusion  of  standards  is  to  increase 
horizontal integration on the agricultural level. These factors can also be of relevance for 
other pre-accession countries with a dominance of small-scale holdings, such as Bulgaria and 
Romania. 
The empirical results confirm that the processor should have an incentive to specialize in high 
quality production, since procuring high quality raw materials c.p. increases profits. More 
subtly, however, achieving higher profits in large cooperatives is very likely to be hampered 
by the considerable inefficiencies that result from their governance structures’ complexity and 
low transparency. Thus, depending on ownership status, the performance of milk processing 
firms is also likely to differ in the future. In addition, it is evident that large cooperatives may 
even  have  more  competitive  disadvantages  in  the  dairy  market  in  the  future,  while  their 
performance  enhancements  will  be  hampered  by  more  efficient  private  firms  on  the 
globalizing dairy market. 
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